Photo: Department for Science, Innovation & Technology / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 2.0
Businesses preparing for quantum-era cyber threats are being urged to identify every critical use of cryptography before replacing the algorithms that protect their systems.
Inventory before migration
The advice comes as the US National Security Agency, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and Australia’s Cyber Security Centre publish new questions organisations can use to test whether suppliers are ready for post-quantum cryptography.
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Their guidance places cryptographic discovery at the first stage of a transition: locating encryption and authentication dependencies, assessing system-level risk, prioritising upgrades and then implementing new protections. It is a practical warning against treating post-quantum security as a simple software swap.
A cryptographic inventory should show where public-key encryption, digital signatures, certificates, protocols, hardware modules and third-party services are used. It must also identify the applications, data and business processes that would be affected if those protections become vulnerable or cannot be upgraded.
Why the issue is urgent
Quantum computers capable of breaking today’s widely used public-key cryptography do not yet exist at the required scale. But security agencies warn that sensitive information stolen now could be retained and decrypted later if the technology matures.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology released its first three post-quantum cryptography standards in August 2024. In late October, NIST published a transition roadmap that calls for quantum-vulnerable algorithms to be phased out of its standards by 2035, with higher-risk systems moving earlier.
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That timetable makes discovery essential. Organisations cannot sensibly set priorities without knowing which certificates, devices, cloud services, payment systems and supplier products rely on older cryptography — or whether they can support replacements.
Vendor risk cannot be ignored
For banks, insurers, telecoms companies and public bodies, much of the relevant technology sits outside direct control. Cloud platforms, software providers, managed security suppliers and connected devices may each make their own cryptographic choices.
The new joint guidance says delayed supplier readiness can leave an organisation exposed even where its internal cyber teams have a sound migration plan. Procurement and contract-renewal processes therefore need to ask vendors about their cryptographic visibility, upgrade roadmaps and support for the emerging standards.
This is especially relevant for African and Caribbean institutions modernising digital payments, government services and cross-border data systems. Long technology replacement cycles, dependence on overseas vendors and limited specialist cyber capacity can turn a late response into an expensive overhaul.
A business governance task
The goal is not to replace everything immediately. NIST’s approach is risk-based: start with systems protecting long-lived, high-value or highly sensitive data, then plan changes around normal technology refreshes where possible.
A live inventory also supports “crypto-agility” — the ability to change cryptographic protections without rebuilding entire services. That can lower disruption when standards, threats or supplier capabilities change.
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For boardrooms, the immediate question is therefore not which post-quantum algorithm to buy. It is whether the organisation can clearly account for the cryptography already embedded across its business.

